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Are Old-age Pension System Reforms Going Public in Latin America? 
 
 
Abstract 
This article reviews two rounds of pension reforms in ten Latin American 
countries to determine whether they are moving away from individual retirement 
accounts (IRAs).  Although the idea is provocative, we conclude that the notion of “going 
public” alone is insufficient to characterize the new politics of old-age pension reform.  
As opposed to the politics of enactment of IRAs of the late twentieth century, pension 
reform in Latin America in recent years has combined significant comeback of public 
components in old-age income support with improvement of IRAs. Clearly, the policy 
prescriptions that were most influential during the first round of reforms in Latin America 
have been re-evaluated. The World Bank and other organizations that promoted IRAs 
have recognized that pension reform should pay more attention to poverty reduction, 
coverage and equity, and to protect participants from market risks. The experience and 
challenges faced by countries that introduced IRAs, the changes in policies by 
international financing institutions, and the recent financial volatility and heavy losses 
experienced in financial markets may have tempered the enthusiasm of other countries 
from applying the same type of reforms. Scholars and policymakers around the globe 
could benefit from looking closely at these changes in pension policy. 
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Introduction 
In 1981, Chile initiated old-age pension reforms that introduced mandatory 
funded individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and moved away from public systems. 
During the next one or two decades, ten other Latin American countries followed in 
Chile’s wake: Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. As illustrated in Table 1, this first round 
of reforms can be characterized as a full or partial shift from pay-as-you-go (PAYG) to 
IRAs schemes that involved a movement from: taxes to savings as financing mechanism, 
variable to defined contributions, defined to variable benefits, benefit to assets retirement 
income, social insurance to personal savings, public to private management, and state to 
individuals sharing risk.  Figure 1 complements Table 1 and illustrates that pension 
reforms were more complex than two extremes. The first round of pension reforms in 
Latin America can be divided in three different types: in “mixed” reforms IRAs 
complemented the PAYG scheme, in “parallel” reforms IRAs were created as an 
alternative to the PAYG scheme; and in “substitutive” reforms IRAs replaced the PAYG 
scheme (Mesa-Lago, 20004a).  
 
[TABLE 1 GOES ABOUT HERE] 
 
In recent years, even before the onset of the financial crisis, a second round of 
pension reforms was initiated to strengthen the public component and address the 
problems created by individual accounts (Kay and Sinha, 2008). The most notorious case 
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is Argentina, where IRAs have been recently eliminated and replaced by a public pension 
system (El Mercurio, 2008; Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, 2008).  
Using a comparative historical approach and policy analysis techniques, this 
article reviews the two rounds of pension reforms to determine whether Latin American 
countries are moving away from individual pensions. We incorporate into our analysis 
the influence of the recent financial crisis, which is placing new challenges to pension 
systems worldwide. We base our analysis on ten countries that introduced some form of 
IRAs since 1981.  Three other countries –Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Panama– are not 
included because IRAs were only enacted a few months ago, because they are not fully 
implemented, or because no revisions have been introduced to the system.  Countries 
such as Brazil are excluded from the analysis because they reformed their pension 
systems without moving towards IRAs. Brazil, however, has a long history with 
occupational plans managed by private companies and more recently is allowing sub-
national state governments to create supplementary occupational pension plans.  
Many differences can be found between the Latin American countries that we 
analyze. However, even though Latin America is quite heterogeneous, its labor markets 
and social security systems share some common features such as a large informal 
economy and a variety of uncoordinated institutions providing old age income protection 
(Gill, Packard, and Yermo, 2005; Kritzer 2000; Marier and Mayer, 2007).  These features 
provide a common ground for pension reform in the region and allow us to compare two 
rounds of pension reforms maintaining other aspects relatively constant. 
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Table 2 includes a brief summary of some elements of the two rounds of pension 
reform that we have discussed above, but more importantly, it incorporates other 
elements and serves as a guide to the analysis that follows. 
 
First Round of Pension Reforms: The Politics of IRA Enactment 
During the late twentieth century, but particularly during the 1990s, the fear of 
large fiscal imbalances and mismanaged pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension schemes 
prompted ten Latin American countries to enact IRAs (see Figure 1). Although the 
reforms improved long-term system sustainability, problems such as low coverage, a 
shrinking social safety net, and imperfect regulatory frameworks, remained. 
 
[FIGURE 1 GOES AROUND HERE] 
 
IRAs were intended to create a stronger link between benefits and contributions to 
get workers to view their contributions as personal savings rather than as a tax. This 
mindset would in turn encourage workers to contribute and increase coverage and 
compliance rates. However, the evidence from Latin America suggests that introducing 
IRAs did not improve coverage and compliance rates (ECLAC, 2006; Rofman and 
Lucchetti, 2006; Mesa-Lago, 2008). Figure 2 shows that coverage rates, measured as the 
ratio of contributors to workers, actually declined after the reforms. This result clearly 
illustrates that structural features of labor markets are more relevant than pension system 
design in driving coverage. 
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[FIGURE 2 GOES AROUND HERE] 
 
Numerous other factors, including the type of benefits offered, funding 
mechanisms, administrative arrangements, and incentives, explain the variations in 
coverage (Bertranou, 2004; Calvo and Williamson, 2008; FIAP, 2006). For example, the 
1994 reform in Argentina raised retirement ages and vesting periods, creating stricter 
conditions to access benefits and thus reducing coverage for the population aged 65 and 
over from 78 percent in 1992 to about 65 percent in the mid-2000s.  In addition, 
unemployment, informal labor markets, and cultural factors are strong determinants of 
compliance and coverage rates. 
Besides their failure to expand pension coverage, IRAs also removed some 
solidarity mechanisms of PAYG schemes (Mesa-Lago, 2004b). Although with important 
limitations, PAYG schemes involve not only intergenerational redistribution 
(contributions from active workers are used to pay the bill of retirees) but also 
redistribution between income groups (they aim to transfer income across different 
cohorts).  In contrast, IRAs are based on personal savings and leave the responsibility of 
income redistribution to social assistance and minimum pensions provided by state-run 
programs. As contributory coverage declined or remained stagnant, social safety net and 
non-contributory programs have grown in number of beneficiaries in several countries 
such as Chile and Colombia. 
A third challenging area of IRA reforms relate to imperfect regulations, such as 
protection from political interference (Bertranou, Rofman, and Grushka, 2003; Calvo and 
Williamson, 2008; Gill, Packard, and Yermo, 2005). Although PAYG may also suffer 
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from weak regulations, IRAs were oversold in their capacity to prevent political 
manipulation. A driving reason for reform towards private administration was the 
intention to create pension systems highly insulated from political intervention, however, 
the evidence suggests that the reformed systems remain vulnerable to political 
manipulation. For example, loose regulation led to ambiguous approaches to transition 
rules in Bolivia and in the early 2000s allowed the government of Argentina to defer its 
debt by “selling” bonds to the fund management companies until a default occurred. 
Because of low coverage rates and decreased solidarity, governments continue 
financing a substantial part of the pension bill and public institutions continue managing 
pension benefits, including defined benefit, minimum guaranteed benefits, and social 
assistance pensions. Public institutions also work as guarantors of the private IRA 
scheme. In sum, although IRAs play an important role in reformed pension systems in 
Latin America, their enactment did not result in a full withdrawal of governments from 
the pension systems (Barr, 2002; Kay and Sinha, 2008; Schulz, 2009; Williamson, 2001). 
As has been pointed out previously, the line between private and public can be “fuzzy” 
when states regulate, promote, finance, and mandate private pension provision (by 
Béland and Brian, 2008). 
 
Second Round of Pension Reforms: The Politics of Expansion of Public Pensions 
and Improvement of IRAs 
During the last few years, Latin America started a second round of pension 
reforms in response to the shortcomings of IRAs. The new political context is 
characterized by governments being less enthusiastic about privatization. The reforms are 
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resulting in a significant comeback of public components in old-age income support 
systems in an attempt to better balance social risks with individual savings. The case that 
best ilustrates this trend is Chile, where a comprehensive pension bill was approved in 
2008 (Barr and Diamond, 2008; Kritzer, 2008; Vial and Melguizo, 2008).  The 2008-
2009 financial turmoil will probably reinforce the changes of the second round of reforms 
in Latin America. The most extreme case is Argentina, which re-nationalized IRAs partly 
in response to the financial crisis. 
 
The Comeback of Public Pensions 
Public institutions have maintained an important role even after privatization. In 
the second round of reforms, the direct involvement of public institutions in pension 
provision has been reinforced in three ways: 1) allowing workers to switch back to the 
PAYG scheme; 2) incorporating solidarity and income redistribution mechanisms; and 3) 
creating new public pension reserve funds. 
Choice between IRAs and PAYG. The first round of reforms generally established 
that new workers were to join the IRAs, with no option to switch back to the PAYG 
scheme. Perhaps one of the more radical transformations of the second round of pension 
reforms has been allowing some workers to switch back to the PAYG scheme (U.S. 
Social Security Administration, 2007-09, 2007-04, 2005-02, 2004-04). For example, in 
2007 Peru permitted workers enrolled in IRAs to rejoin the PAYG scheme if they had 
contributed to the PAYG scheme before 1996 and met conditions to retire under that 
scheme. This law aimed to increase pensions for eligible workers who would have 
otherwise received a smaller pension in the IRA scheme. In 2008, Uruguay also enacted 
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regulations that allowed some affiliates to leave IRAs and switch back to the defined 
benefit scheme. Argentina had taken the reforms one step further before the re-
nationalization in 2008. During 2007, the government changed the default affiliation to 
the PAYG scheme for workers entering the formal labor market and – for a six-month 
window – allowed individuals already in the IRA scheme to switch back to the PAYG 
scheme; of those eligible to switch, 80 percent stayed in the IRA scheme. In addition, 
individuals within 10 years of retirement with low IRA balances were automatically 
transferred to the PAYG scheme. Insured with low balances were defined as those that, at 
the normal age of retirement, would not be able to buy an annuity equivalent to the 
minimum pension paid by the defined benefit scheme. Furthermore, the benefit paid by 
the PAYG scheme increased from 0.85 percent to 1.5 percent of pre-retirement wages. 
This means that for a worker retiring with 30 years of contributions, the replacement rate 
would increase from 24 percent (30*0.85) to 45 percent (30*1.5). Note that this benefit is 
paid on top of the basic pension. This change considerably raised the rate of return on 
contributions made to the public defined benefit scheme. In 2008, Argentina decided to 
re-nationalize its IRA scheme (Cottani, 2008; Economist, 2008; The Wall Street Journal, 
2008). The government justified this aggressive move as a reaction to the financial 
market crisis, but reducing its budget constraints was clearly a big incentive. The 
approved bill stated that by January of 2009 IRA funds were to be absorbed by the public 
PAYG scheme. 
Solidarity and income redistribution. The first round of pension reforms partially 
removed important solidarity and redistribution mechanisms. In response, several 
countries introduced cash transfer programs and expanded their non-contributory 
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pensions, financed by general tax revenue, to supplement contributory pensions and 
protect old-age people against poverty (Consejo Asesor Presidencial Para la Reforma 
Previsional, 2006; U.S. Social Security Administration, 2008-02, 2007-01, 2006-07, 
2003-12). For example, El Salvador created a subsidy for retirees receiving IRA benefits 
that are lower than they would have been under the old PAYG scheme. In early 2008, 
Chile approved a pension reform bill aiming to provide universal and more equitable 
benefits. The new system of “solidarity pensions” gradually replaces the means-tested 
pensions and the guaranteed minimum pensions with two types of benefits: a non-
contributory pension and a supplementary pension (top-up) benefit for those who have 
contributed to the private system. The supplementary monthly benefit starts at the level of 
the non-contributory solidarity pension and ends at about US$ 400. It also provides a tax 
credit of 15 percent for voluntary savings which is targeted to low-income workers. 
Another interesting case is Colombia; in 2003 it introduced a solidarity pension fund, 
which pays non-contributory benefits and matches contributions for low-income workers.  
Although solidarity and income redistribution mechanisms have been enhanced 
elsewhere in the region, poverty reduction and gender equality are still considered 
missing or incomplete pieces of pension reform in Latin America (Barrientos, 2006). 
Reserve funds for public pensions. Latin American countries have also passed 
legislation creating separate reserve funds to provide greater financial stability and reduce 
the burden on general revenues of funding the government’s pension obligations (U.S. 
Social Security Administration, 2007-09, 2006-09). Chile has instituted two separate 
reserve funds (Pension Reserve Fund and Economic and Social Stabilization Fund) in 
response to the large budget surpluses attributed to the country’s record copper sales 
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during recent years. Both funds will not be managed directly by the government, but by 
the Central Bank (65 percent of the funds) and third parties (35 percent of the funds). In 
Argentina, a state-owned bank supervised by multiple-institutions manages a 
Sustainability Fund, and a committee including members from different agencies 
oversees investment decisions. 
 
Improvement of IRAs  
Governments and private administrators have clearly acknowledged the 
shortcomings of IRAs and the need for intervention. However, this recognition does not 
necessarily imply the termination of IRAs, as what happened in Argentina. The second 
round of pension reform in Latin America is also about revision and correction of the 
flaws of IRAs. Three examples of reforms aiming to improve IRAs are: (1) extending 
mandatory contributions to workers not currently covered, (2) lowering costs to account 
holders, and (3) changing the investment rules for pension assets. 
Extend coverage. The first round of pension reforms typically made IRAs 
voluntary for self-employed workers. The second round extends mandatory participation 
to these workers (Consejo Asesor Presidencial Para la Reforma Previsional, 2006; U.S. 
Social Security Administration, 2008-02, 2007-01, 2006-08, 2006-07, 2005-05). For 
example, following Costa Rica and Colombia, Chile will start requiring the self-
employed to gradually join the IRA scheme within the next seven years. Mexico has 
enacted similar measures for the self-employed and has extended IRAs to federal public 
employees. Other countries, such as Peru, are also discussing compulsory savings for all 
categories of workers. 
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Lower IRAs costs. High administrative fees and premiums for survivors and 
disability insurance have lowered net rates of return for account holders and produced 
very large profits for many fund management and insurance companies. The problem has 
been aggravated by participants’ lack of awareness of the importance of fees (James, 
Packard, and Holzmann, 2008).  To lower costs for account holders, countries have 
implemented a number of measures (AIOS 2007; U.S. Social Security Administration, 
2008-04, 2008-02, 2007-11, 2007-06, 2007-04, 2006-11, 2006-09, 2006-08, 2006-03, 
2005-12, 2005-09, 2005-05, 2003-12). For example, in 2008 Mexico created an indicator 
to help account holders compare the net rate of return of pension fund management 
companies. New entrants to the labor force who do not choose a management company 
are assigned by default to the one with the highest rate of return. Transfers between 
companies are allowed once a year, but transfers to the company with the highest rate of 
return are now permitted without restrictions. In addition, companies are now allowed to 
charge a fee on account balances, but not on monthly contributions. Countries such as El 
Salvador, Chile, and Peru took a similar path. Eventhough these policies are expected to 
have a positive effect, it is difficult to predict their magnitude. Some of the instruments to 
induce lower costs rely on past performace and thus their actual effectiveness is 
uncertain.   
Investment rules for pension assets. Portfolios have been heavily concentrated in 
government bonds, but new types of instruments and multi-fund strategies have been 
authorized during the second round of reforms. Numerous countries have implemented 
such changes, including: Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru (AIOS 2007; U.S. Social 
Security Administration, 2008-04, 2007-08, 2006-12, 2006-08, 2006-01, 2005-03, 2004-
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06, 2003-12, 2003-10). Another way to cope with risks has been the implementation of 
multi-funds, where insured workers can choose among several risk-related portfolios. It is 
not clear that multi-funds have and would actually contribute to financial literacy and 
adequate returns for the average insured worker. Furthermore, the recent financial market 
turmoil resulted in serious declines in IRA saving assets, suggesting that they were too 
exposed to market risks. Numerous reasonable concerns have been raised on whether 
letting workers choose high risk portfolios is a proper social security policy.  
 
Conclusion 
This article addresses whether pension reforms in Latin America are moving 
away from IRAs.  Although the idea is provocative, we conclude that the notion of 
“going public” alone is insufficient to characterize the new politics and political economy 
of old-age pension reform. Table 2 summarizes our argument. As opposed to what 
happened in the 1980s and 1990s, pension reforms in Latin America in recent years have 
combined a significant expansion of the public components of retirement income support 
with improvement of IRAs.   
During the period of enactment, ten Latin American countries introduced 
mandatory funded IRAs as a full or partial replacement for the old PAYG public 
schemes. One remarkable aspect about this first round of pension reforms is that, even 
though it introduced substantial changes in funding and management, in most countries 
public institutions assumed a crucial role not only as regulating agents, but also in 
managing and financing minimum guaranteed and social assistance pension benefits. 
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The second round of pension reforms, which began after 2005, has reinforced the 
involvement of public institutions in the pension system.  In addition, numerous countries 
have introduced measures to improve IRAs.  The driving force of the second round of 
reforms has been to increase coverage, equity, and efficiency of the overall system.  With 
the exception of Argentina, which has re-nationalized its pension system, the magnitude 
in the second round of reforms seems to be less radical compared to the path-breaking 
changes introduced by the first round. 
The dominant policy prescriptions in vogue during the first round of reforms in 
Latin America –three pillars system– have been clearly re-evaluated (Kay and Sinha, 
2008). As countries started to engage in a second round of reforms, the World Bank – and 
other international organizations that promoted IRA pension reforms – has acknowledged 
that more attention should be paid to mechanisms to reduce poverty in old-age, to expand 
coverage and equity, and to protect participants from market risks. Non-contributory and 
universal pensions are recognized as playing a greater role. The experience and 
challenges faced by countries that introduced IRAs in their pension systems, the changes 
in policies by international financing institutions, and the recent financial volatility and 
heavy losses experienced in financial markets may have tempered the enthusiasm of other 
countries from applying the same type of reforms. Scholars and policymakers around the 
globe could benefit from looking closely at these changes in pension policy. 
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Table 1. Comparison of PAYG and IRAs old-age pension schemes 
  PAYG IRA 
Financing Taxes Savings 
Contributions Variable Defined 
Benefits Defined Variable 
Income Benefit income Assets income 
Form Social insurance Personal savings 
Management Public Private 
Risks State Individuals 
Source: Authors' elaboration. 
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Table 2. Comparison of first and second round of old-age pension reforms in Latin America. 
  First round of reforms Second round of reforms 
Timing Most frequent in the 1990s Undergoing 
Politics Enactment of IRAs Expansion of public pensions and improvement of IRAs 
Motivation Fiscal burden Coverage, equity, and efficiency 
Transformation Path-breaking Path-dependent 
Prescription Three-pillar system Five-pillar system 
Source: Authors' elaboration. 
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Figure 1. Structural reforms to old-age pension systems in Latin America. 
Note: *Substitutive;  **Re-nationalized in 2008. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Mesa-Lago, 2004a; Gill, Truman, and Yermo, 2005; and 
U.S. Social Security Administration, 2003-2008, 2008b. 
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Figure 2. Coverage rates in Latin America before and after first round of old-age pension reforms.
Note:  Coverage is measured as contributors/economically active population at two time-points: the year before the reform, and in 2002.
Source:  Adapted from Mesa-Lago, 2005; Rofman and Luccetti, 2006.
